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ABSTRACT
NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
SINO-KOREAN BILATERAL TRADE, 1992-2007
By
Rina Lee
University of New Hampshire, May, 2008
This thesis examines northeast Asian regional economic integration with a case
study of Sino-Korean trade. Since the Cold War, there has been an increase in regional
bilateral economic cooperation. South Korea began to open its market to foreign direct
investors in the 1990s. This study asks what contributes to the rise of bilateral trade and
tests the following hypothesis using both qualitative and quantitative methods: If a
national leader perceives growing pressure of globalization, then there is strong
promotion of an integrated trade policy.
The study of Sino-Korean trade reveals that Kim Dae Jung's view on a globalized
economy, which created a more competitive international market, has greatly contributed
to Korea's economic cooperation with the People's Republic of China. Kim Dae Jung's
economic reforms which modified the Korean market to become more accessible to the
foreign investors facilitated the trade flows. Moreover, his individual effort to build a
companionship with Beijing at the presidential summit also contributed to the rise of
Sino-Korean bilateral trade. The Sino-Korean case study provides an implication that an
individual decision maker's personal view on globalization can influence a bilateral trade
relationship.

vii

CHAPTER I

PROBLEM

Since the Cold War, there have been significant changes in the international
political economy. The initial idea of European integration was hatched by six Western
Europeans who formed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which
eventually evolved into the 28 member European Union (EU), comprising economies
from both Western and Eastern Europe.1 While a somewhat dramatic and long-drawn
process, the EU members have removed trade barriers in intra-regional trade and are
gradually becoming a coherent and powerful political and economic player in
international relations.
However, this regional integrative process has not been confined to Western
Europe. In August 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).2 Intra-ASEAN trade
has grown dramatically as members have actively collaborated to enhance intra-regional
free trade agreements (FTA) and expanded membership to include other neighboring
nations. Similar regional or bilateral agreements have also linked together regional
economies in North America (North American Free Trade Agreement), Latin America

1

EUROPA, "Member States of the EU,"
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (accessed April 15, 2008).
2
ASEAN, "Overview Association of Southeast Asian Nations," http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed
April 15, 2008).
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(Central Community), the Middle East (Greater Arab Free Trade Area), and Africa
(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa).
Thus, as the promise of the Bretton Woods system has become endangered by
internal conflicts encountered during the current Doha Development Round, global
economies seem more willing to abandon multilateral trade negotiations to pursue
regional and bilateral economic collaborations. This is to facilitate their trade and
investment flows, including the United States. In 2003, President George W. Bush
signed a bilateral trade treaty between the United States and Singapore. The bilateral
agreement on the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement allowed the United States to
strengthen American market access in goods, services, investment, and government
procurement.3 Under the agreement, Singapore ensured non-tariff treatment on all U.S.
products. But this was not solely an agreement between two economies; the U.S.Singapore FTA serves as the foundation of America's economic relationship with the
ASEAN initiative (EAI).4 Additionally, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Venezuela have developed their bilateral relationship recently. China and Venezuela
signed a trade agreement in November 1985.5 After the establishment of the bilateral
trade relationship, there were five economic and trade committee meetings. ChinaVenezuelan bilateral trade was only about $1.4 million in 1974, but increased to $ 478
million in 2002.6 In 1997, Australia and the European Union negotiated a bilateral

3

Office of the United Stats Trade Representative, "Quick Facts: U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,"
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2003/Quick_Facts_USSingapore_Free_Trade_Agreement.html (accessed May 6, 2008).
4
Ibid.
5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Venezuela,"
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/gjlb/3538/default.htm (accessed May 6, 2008)
6
Ibid.
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agreement. The European Union is Australia's largest trade partner with the amount of €
22,415 million which accounts for 18 % of Australia's trade. Australia exports
agricultural goods to the European Union and imports medicaments, motor vehicles,
•

7

machinery, telecommunication equipment, and paperboard from the European Union.
Besides the U.S.-Singapore, China-Venezuelan, and EU-Australian bilateral
relationships, there are more than 30 bilateral trade agreements negotiated between
countries as of 2008.8 There are still many bilateral talks pending to be approved such as
South Korea-U.S. FTA, which was a main topic of conversation during the April 2008
meeting between President Bush and the newly-elected South Koran leader, Lee Myungbak. Regardless of the geographical distance, there is an increase of the bilateral trade
agreements and the participating countries continuously seek other possible partners for
mutual economic benefits.
Until the late 1980s, the United States was South Korea's number one trading
partner. Even though South Korea had bilateral treaties with other countries, such as
Japan and Germany, Washington DC was South Korea's major destination for both
imports and exports. South Korea was somewhat reluctant to open its market to other
foreign investors. Yet South Korea started opening its doors to foreign investors in the
early 1990s. Seoul, the capital of South Korea, began to trade with the European Union
and other Asian countries, such as China and ASEAN. Seoul discussed a bilateral treaty
with Chile and signed a FTA deal. Seoul's exports to Mexico and Canada increased.9
7

European Commission, "Trade Issues,"
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/australia/index_en.htm (accessed April 15, 2008).
8
Bilaterals. Org, "Negotiations," http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=2 (accessed April
15, 2008).
9
Seung Koo Oh, Hanmi Dongmangeu Mirawha Hankookeu Sontak (Future of U.S-Korean Alliance and
Korea's Choice) (Seoul, Korea: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2005), 40.
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Korea also looked at the Middle East. South Korea's active interaction with other states
for trade resulted in the diversification of trading partners. Seoul's changing attitude
towards other countries poses a question of why Korea opened its market to other
countries during this time. In order to find what influenced Korea's openness, this thesis
examines Korea's relationship with the People's Republic of China as a case study.
The case of South Korea's bilateral trade is a good example for bilateral economic
relationships. Exports make up approximately 40 percent of South Korea's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).^Similarly to South Korea, many East Asian countries, such as
Taiwan and Singapore, heavily reply on exports, so they pursue outwardly oriented
economy. South Korea is currently negotiating for bilateral treaties with the European
Union, India, Canada, Mexico, MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC).11 Singapore and the United States have a Free Trade
Agreement. China is discussing bilateral free trade agreements with Australia, Thailand,
ASEAN, and India. Vietnam is cooperating for trade with Japan. Despite the differences
in history and government ideologies, these states continuously pursue bilateral trade for
economic benefits. Thus, the case study of Sino-Korean bilateral trade will provide tools
to examine other Asian outwardly oriented countries' bilateral relationships as well as
Korea's other bilateral negotiations.
This political economic phenomenon occurs between the People's Republic of
China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The PRC and ROK have shared a long
historical relationship due to their geographical locations. Before China's defeat in the
10

Jung-a Song, "Emerging markets drive S Korea exports," Financial Times, 1 May 2008,
http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/9fcc4112-1727-1 ldd-bbfc-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=l (accessed May
1,2008).
11
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Free Trade Agreement,"
http://www.fta.go.kr/user/fta_korea/info.asp?country_idx=25 (accessed May 3, 2008).
4

Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, Korean politics, economics, and culture were
overwhelmingly dominated by China. The ancient Chinese dynasties, which had great
influence on their neighboring countries in East Asia, regarded Korea as their puppet,
thus discouraging Koreans from exercising their own independence and sovereignty for
more than five hundred years. The Qing Empire (1644-1912) defended its dynasty in
Korea by "intervening directly, not only to preserve its geopolitical position but also to
promote its commercial interests."12 China did not allow Korea to enjoy its own
sovereignty, resulting in China's approval of the succession of Korean rulers and where
Korea could trade. Because of this historic hierarchical relationship, Korean leaders have
always sought to distance themselves from China in order to enjoy unfettered
sovereignty.
Following the signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice, South Korea (hereafter
referred to as Korea) was on the path toward capitalism and democracy aided by the
United States. The civil war "destroyed over 40 per cent of industrial facilities and
damaged 20 per cent of the housing stock."13 With economic and military aid from
Washington, Seoul, reconstructed and adopted outwardly oriented development in
1962.14 Moreover, its exports to the U.S. resulted in an increase of the importance of the
United States as a trading partner as well as Korea's self-confidence.
Sino-Korean bilateral trade was only about US $40,000 in 1979.15 The PRC and
the ROK signed a bilateral treaty on August 24, 1992, yet it was not widely known
12

Kirk Larson, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Choson Korea, 1850-1910
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 45.
13
OECD, OECD Economic Surveys (Paris, France: OECD Publication, 1994), 13.
14
Lawrence C. Reardon, The Reluctant Dragon (Seattle: University of Washington, 2002), 15.
15
Scott Snyder, "China-Korean Relations: Hu Visits the Two Koreas," Comparative Connections: A
Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (January 2007): 105.
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/cpc/cpcjan06/cpcjan06j.pdf
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among Koreans and was not even regarded as being significant. In the 1990s, however,
Koreans frequently discussed China's rapid Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and
Beijing's increase in engagement with other foreign countries including its membership
in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Korean attitudes were divided into two different groups regarding the country's
relationship with mainland China. Some Koreans believed that getting reengaged with
China economically would diminish Korea's sovereignty and bring about a return to its
previous subservient status. Others argued that building a relationship with China would
help the Korean economy become more competitive in the world markets through
bilateral trade. Regardless of the divided public opinion of South Koreans, Sino-Korean
bilateral trade has significantly increased from US $5 billion in 1992 to US $100 billion
in 2004.16 PRC President Hu Jintao and ROK President Rho Moo Hyun set a goal to
reach US $200 billion by 2012 during the presidential summit in Seoul, Korea in 2005.
To facilitate this growing economic relationship, the leaders of these two Asian economic
giants discussed methods to increase economic interaction, coordinate economic policies,
as well as to resolve historical disputes. Both sides thus have proposed initial steps
toward greater regional economic integration by establishing a free trade agreement; their
most recent negotiation took place on the Korean island of Cheju in February 2008.
The fundamental question posed by this thesis is what factors contribute to the
promotion of integrated trade policy. In other words, the research question of this thesis is
what plays the most important role in promoting an integrated trade policy between
countries. The dependent variable is promotion of an integrated trade policy, and the this

Ibid., 102.
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thesis explores the leadership as one of the factors that cause the promotion of an
integrated trade policy between countries.
This thesis will look specifically at the Sino-Korean economic relationship and
exclude North Korea and Taiwan. Furthermore, unless it is specifically mentioned, Korea
17

refers to South Korea throughout this study.
Possible Hypotheses
Kenneth Waltz argues in Man, the State, and War that political science
phenomena can be explained using three different levels: individual, domestic, and
international. This research paper will follow Waltz's three levels of analysis when
exploring the possible explanations of the dependent variable and focus on the individual
level.
Individual Decision-Makers
A possible hypothesis is: If a leader has a strong vision that economic integration
enhances a country's prosperity and security, then there is strong promotion of an
integrated trade policy.
A leader of a state plays an important role in shaping trade policies. Individual
leaders, who pursue trade expansion for domestic economic benefits or bilateral trade, in
order to normalize a relationship with a certain country, may greatly influence trade
policies. Jean Monnet, who was "the most important single architect of the European
Community (EC),"18 stated,

In the Korean and Chinese systems, last names precedefirstnames. All Korean and Chinese politician
names such as Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Hu Jintao, in this thesis have the last times before first
names except for Synman Rhee, who was educated in the United States before he became president in
1948.
George Ross, Jacques, Delors and European Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.

7

I was sure that the lessons we were learning day after day from our
difficulties and our successes would spread far beyond the circle of the
ECSC [European Community of Steel and Coal], which itself was
growing even wider. Gradually, other tasks and other people would
become subject to the same common rules and institutions - or
.

.

.
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perhaps to new institutions.
Monnet's initial ideas for a "United States of Europe" helped the ECSC evolve
into the European Economic Community (EEC) at the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the
EU today.20 Jean Monnet greatly influenced the creation of the European regional block.
His individual belief and his political power both played a role in the creation of the EEC.
Publications on Jean Monnet in relation to the EEC do not discuss where his belief in
integration originated, yet this analysis demonstrates that an individual view can
influence the concept of regional integration and inspire the actual establishment of
integrative structures.
The literature on Monnet as the primary architect of the EEC can be possibly
applied to the case of the Sino-Korean bilateral economic relationship. Either the
previous or present leaders of the PRC or the ROK, or head figures of major economic
sectors, such as Chung Ju Young, the founder of Hyundai, may have pursued personal
goals to bring the northeast Asian region together. Yet, it is difficult to collect literature
on individual business leaders of Korea or China due to a lack of available information.
For instance, Chung Ju Young discusses in his autobiography his personal view of
economy and business philosophy, such as how Hyundai developed a global partnership

Jean Monnet, Memoir, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1978), 10.
Lowell G. Noonan, review of Memoirs, by Jean Monnet," The Western Political Quarterly 32, no. 2
(June 1979): 244-245.
20

8

with Ford Motor Company. However, Chung does not discuss his view on Hyundai's
international trade.
Domestic Determinants
At the state level of analysis, a possible hypothesis is: If an individual state has a
strong interest in international trade to accelerate domestic development, then there is
strong promotion of an integrated trade policy.
If a state advocates regional economic integration as a way to grow the domestic
economy and set it as the top priority of the national agenda, it is likely to shape trade
policy accordingly. One of the most successful cases of regional economic cooperation at
the state level is the EU, whose member states' interests in the membership have caused
enlargement of the regional organization. The EU was evolved from the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1950 and then the European Economic Community of
1957.22
The case of the EU is a primary example that an individual state's interest in
political and economic benefits from membership contributed to the enhancement of the
regional economic community. Member states were able to benefit from the regional
policies, which created jobs and provided infrastructure in poor areas.23 Countries could
increase trade with neighbors, thus boosting the domestic economy and reducing the
unemployment rates. Since the organization was initially designed to maintain regional
peace, member states were assured regional security and political stability in the

21

Ju Young Chung, Shiryoneun Isodo Shinpaenun Upda (There Could Be Difficulty, Yet No Failure)
(Seoul, Korea: Hyundai Moonhwa Newspaper, 1992), 173.
22
EUROPA, "The History of the European Union," http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (accessed
October 15,2007).
23
EUROPA, "The History of the European Union," http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (accessed
April 20, 2008).
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aftermath of World War II. The EU has expanded its membership to other countries for
the past four decades. Countries such as Turkey and Croatia are currently candidates for
membership, believing that they obtain political and economic benefits by joining the
organization.24
International Environment
When looking at the international level, a possible hypothesis is: If there is
growing pressure of globalization, then there is strong promotion of an integrated trade
policy.
This study initially tested various international environmental explanations for
regional integration, including Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart's argument that regional
economic integration was caused by growing regionalism measured by bilateral trade and
regional cooperation.
ASEAN is an excellent comparative case; currently the member states are actively
working with expanding economic relationships on China, South Korea, and Japan,
which is known as ASEAN + 3. In the case study of the EU, domestic policies were the
most important contributing factors for the success of the organization, whereas the case
of ASEAN is analyzed at the regional level. Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has
expanded its membership from five to ten founding members and has promoted regional
economic integration and stability. Despite the differentiations of the member states in
history, government types, economic status, and religious beliefs, the organization has
been able to evolve successfully, help investment, and smooth capital flow among the ten

24

EUROPA, "Candidate Countries,"
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/index_en.htm (accessed April 20, 2008).
25
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "About ASEAN," http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed
April 7, 2007).
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member countries. More importantly, the outcome of annual meetings for economic
integration directly forces the member states to promote integrated trade policies for
better trade flows.
Since the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, globalization has taken place in the
international community.27 The establishment of international financial and trade
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
brought the world economy closer by facilitating globalization of the monetary systems,
international trade, and financial transactions. This integration has also been enhanced by
the rapid development of communication technology, so that geographical distance is no
longer a big issue in interaction among other states.
Testing of the Three Possible Hypotheses
After conducting research on globalization, there was a need to revise my initial
hypothesis and change the level of analysis. This study initially tested out the
international environment hypothesis. However, it was difficult to test out the hypothesis,
as there was a lack of information regarding Korea's views on globalization and its
impact on Korea's trading policies. Subsequently, this study focused on the individual
decision makers, and their views on globalization in the 1990s. This resulted in the
change of the level of analysis, and the testing of an individual-level hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, the most important factor of globalization is an
individual leader's point of view. Unlike the United States, where checks and balances
ensure the prevention of excessive presidential power, Korean presidents have
26

Ibid.
U.S. Department of State, "The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944,"
http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm (accessed April 7,2008).
27
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comparatively greater influence over government policies. As a result, the way they look
at the world or the way they see politics and economics is what actually shapes the
structure of the government in trade or trade regimes. During the 1992-2007 period of
rapid growth in the Sino-Korean trade relationship, Presidents Kim Young Sam (19931998) and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) played the most influential role in the evolution of
the Sino-Korean relationship. Therefore, the following case study on Korea will
extensively examine the two presidents' views on globalization by comparing and
contrasting their individual backgrounds.
Operationalization and Measurement
Given the discussion above, this thesis will explore the following general
Hypothesis: If a national leader perceives growing pressure of globalization, then there
is strong promotion of an integrated trade policy.
For the specific case of Sino-Korean bilateral trade, the hypothesis is as follows:
If ROK presidents perceive growing pressure of globalization, then there is strong
promotion of an integrated trade policy between the PRC and the ROK.
Before testing the hypothesis, one must operationalize the concepts and the
operative words. The analysis of goals of the establishment of NAFTA and ASEAN
provides a sense of integrated trade policy. The definition of integrated trade policy in
NAFTA is defined as " [to] eliminate barriers to trade, promote conditions of fair
competition, [to] increase investment opportunities, [to] provide adequate protection for
intellectual property rights, [to] establish effective procedures for ... [resolving] disputes,
and to further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation."28 The launch of ASEAN

28

Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Description of the Proposed North American Free
Trade Agreement, prepared by the governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United
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Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 aimed to "promote the region's competitive advantage
as a single production unit. The elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among
member countries is expected to promote greater economic efficiency, productivity, and
competitiveness.
For the purpose of this study, integrated trade policy is defined as binding trade
agreements or policies that promote the reduction of trade barriers such as historical
disputes and that promote the creation of a climate for investment: opportunities and
smooth trade flow. Promotion will be measured by conducting both qualitative and
quantitative analysis. For the qualitative analysis, this study will examine the results of
Sino-Korean presidential summits between 1992 and 2007 and outcomes of government
official meetings. This thesis will evaluate bilateral history over time in order to test
whether growing pressure of globalization has increased the promotion of integrated
trade policies.
Berger, Bhagwati, and Kim discuss the concept of globalization as well as its
positive and negative aspects. Suzanne Berger states that" In the 1990s, there is a
common understanding of globalization as a set of changes in the international economy
that tend to produce a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor."30 Jagdish
Bhagwati defines economic globalization as a constitution of "integration of national
economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by
corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers

States of America," http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/Section_Index.html
(accessed November 3, 2007).
29
ASEAN, "Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations," http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm
(accessed November 5, 2007).
30
Suzzane Berger, "Globalization and Politics," Annual Review ofPolitical Science no. 3 (2000): 44.
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and humanity generally, and flows of technology." Bhagwati's analysis on globalization
is based on the economic aspect of globalization whereas Berger's definition is built on
the 1990s' globalization pattern. Unlike these previous definitions, Samuel Kim defines
globalization as
a set of processes of stretching and intensifying worldwide
interconnectedness in all aspects of human relations and transactions
- economic, social, cultural, environmental, politics, diplomatic, and
security - such that events, decisions, and activities in one part of the
world have immediate consequences for individuals, groups, and
states, in other parts of the world
Whereas Bhagwati's definition focuses on economic perspectives of globalization,
Kim's definition provides a broader, comprehensive explanation. Bhagwati's discussion
may seem more suitable for the purpose of this study since this thesis is focusing on the
economic aspect of regional cooperation, yet the author's definition is somewhat less
comprehensive than Kim's. Thus, for the purpose of this research, Kim's definition for
globalization is adopted and discussed throughout this study.
Growing pressure will be measured through qualitative analysis on how the
concept of globalization has influenced Korea's trade policies using various documents.
These include presidential speeches of Korea, trade policy reviews from the World Trade
Organization (WTO) reported every four years since 1996, and state policies of the ROK.
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett discuss advantages and drawbacks
associated with case studies. George and Bennett argue that a case study allows political
scientists to have a high level of internal validity, examine causal mechanism in depth,
give heuristic identifications of new hypotheses or variables, and easily accommodate

31
32

Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3.
Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea's Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 18.
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complicated causal mechanisms.33 However, the disadvantages are bias in selecting
cases, limitations of generalization, issues of underdetermination, and the lack of
adequate representativeness.34 Despite these drawbacks, a case study is the most
appropriate method in the instance of Sino-Korean trade. This research project will
conduct a crucial case study as follows.

33

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2004), 19-22.
34
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 22-34.
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CHAPTER II

CRUCIAL CASE STUDY: SINO-KOREAN BILATERAL TRADE

Emergence of Globalization and Korea
It is clear that globalization has taken place during the second half of the twentieth
century. It is not quite clear when exactly globalization has begun, yet it is generally
understood that the Bretton Woods system of 1944 enabled globalization to occur. It is no
longer questionable whether or not globalization has enormously influenced the
international community. Jeffrey D. Sachs argues that "the notion that globalization
would result in an acceleration of economic growth has been dramatically confirmed in
the past two centuries."35 In fact, not only does globalization affect international trade,
but also it has crucial impact on other aspects including security and culture. The
development of communication technology, such as the Internet, mobile devices, and
satellite networks, has accelerated the process of globalization, making the world smaller
and closer in terms of time and space.
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, Seoul has actively engaged with the
United States in security and economies. The Korean government was heavily relied on
and still partially relies on Washington to defend itself from the North Korean communist

Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development," Review of World Economics
136, no. 4 (2000): 579.
36
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 1999 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 57.
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regime and in developing democratic society. Korea had undergone regimes until the
1992 election. The first Korean President, Syngman Rhee, inaugurated in 1948, and
reelected in 1956 and again in 1960. Yet, the 1960 Student Revolution forced him to
resign. Rhee voluntary went into exile to Hawaii and died in 1965.37 In 1962, Park Chung
Hee's regime began in Korea. Park Chung Hee contributed to Korea's remarkable
economic development by implementing a series of five-year economic reform plans
between 1962 and 1980, but his dictatorship resulted in a number of deaths of civilians
and politicians who fought against him.
After Park Chung Hee was assassinated in 1979, Chon Do Hwan and Rho Tae
Woo seized political power through the Gwangju Massacre in May 1980 - which is
commonly called 5-18. Chon served his presidency between 1980 and 1988 and Rho
served his presidency from 1988 to 1993. During their terms, many college students as
well as politicians who fought against the Chon and Rho regimes for democracy lost their
lives. University students frequently protested, and this resulted in the destabilization of
society in the 1980s. In December 1992, the first democratic presidential election took
place and as a result Kim Young Sam was elected. In December 1997, Kim Dae Jung was
elected.
The 1962 Park Chung Hee's economic reforms helped the U.S. become the
largest export destination of Korean goods over two decades. The Tokyo Olympics of the
early 1960s and the Seoul Olympics in 1988 ushered in a new era of Korea becoming a
recognized goal player. Seoul subsequently expanded its trade to the European Union and
its Asian neighbors. By the late 1980s or early 1990s, Korea was no longer a Third World
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country struggling against poverty and communism. As Korea was internationally
recognized for its dramatic economic development and industrialization, Koreans became
increasingly aware of and engaged with the issues joining in the international community.
The Seoul Olympics in 1988 brought a change for Koreans to realize that there
was an urgent need for changes in Korean society. Many foreign countries did not know
Korea's existence unless they deployed troops to the Korean War. Koreans learned that
their country did not even appear on some world maps since Korea is small. During the
Olympics, many foreign visitors were unsatisfied with Korea's poor facilities such as
incorrect English signs and Koreans' lack of understanding of foreign cultures, which
showed Seoul's ignorance of other countries. Even though Korea enjoyed a high degree
of economic development, its society was far behind compared to other countries, such as
Japan. The country needed to meet international standards in order to be regarded more
highly by the international community.
During this time, the concept of globalization became fundamental, thus playing a
significant role. Samuel S. Kim, who has written extensively on Chinese foreign policy
and Korea, uses the Korean word, segyehwa meaning globalization.38 According to Kim,
globalization significantly intensified worldwide interactions in many different aspects
(e.g. economic, social, cultural). As one of the Asian Tigers39, it was inevitable for South
Korea to avoid or ignore this international phenomenon. Hyun Ok Park argues,
Two decades after the achievement of vast industrialization through
export-oriented development, South Korea is making still another
"winning" adjustment to the global market and to post-cold war
world politics. This time, South Korea is a transnational investor,
establishing factories and expanding markets abroad. This expansion
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of South Korean overseas investment constitutes the first process of
globalization.
Hyun Ok Park's discussion of Korea's globalization provides a fairly
comprehensive explanation of the country's transition from an outwardly export-based
economy to a globalized economic relationship. As Korea allows companies to invest
overseas and to reshape its domestic economic policy in response to globalization, these
following several events prove that Korea understood globalization. As a member of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade before 1995, the Korean government proceeded
to ratify the Uruguay Round even though there were massive protests by the farmers who
were directly and negatively affected by the trade negotiation. Even though a series of
massive protests and riots temporarily decreased internal social, economic stability,
Seoul's ratification of the Uruguay Round, demonstrated that globalization was a
fundamental concept for the Korean economy.
However, Korea's segyehwa concept of globalization is a comprehensive term
that includes society, politics, culture and environment. Koreans knew that the end of the
Cold War accelerated the process of globalization. It was inevitable to avoid the
phenomenon and the interaction with other states. Koreans needed to learn more about
international phenomena, understand foreign cultures and different political systems, and
become open to other societies. The question is raised as to how Korean leaders regarded
globalization. The following section demonstrates how Korean presidents interpreted and
reacted to globalization in the 1990s.
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South Korean Presidents. 1992-2003
After testing my initial international environmental hypothesis, it became
apparent that the individual decision maker, in this case the Korean presidents, is the
most influential variable affecting Korea's regional integration. As chief commander of
the economic sector, presidents have provided the basic frames for Korean economy in
the 1990s. Their individual presidential speeches presented their plans for economic
reforms. Thus, this study will analyze how an individual decision maker's view on
globalization had played a role in Sino-Korean bilateral relationship by examining the
two administrations in the 1990s: Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae Jung
(1998-2003).
Korea has ministers of strategies and finances, yet they were not as influential as
presidents and tend to be replaced by others frequently. Furthermore, there were
publications that discuss economic ministers' views on economy and their impact on
trade. There were no publications of business leaders, such as Chung Ju Young or Lee
Gun Hee (the President of Samsung), which discuss their views on trade. This result
shows that it is more appropriate to examine presidents as individual decisions makers for
the purpose of this study. Among the three presidents during that time, these two
presidents, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, were directly associated with this
concept and were influential figures. Their authority over economy was the most
influential factor when examining Korea's trade.

20

Rho Tae Woo
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung are the most important decision makers
associated with Korea's segyehwa in the 1990s. Although a Sino-Korean bilateral
relationship was established in August 1992 during the Rho Tae Woo administration
(1988-1993), Rho's opinion on globalization or trade was not explained. Rho Tae Woo
made a state visit to China when Sino-Korean diplomatic ties were established in 1992.
During the Rho administration, the two new partners signed a bilateral pact on economy,
trade, and technology cooperation, resulting in increased investments and bilateral
protections.
Rho was soon succeeded by Kim Young Sam in February 1993. Kim Young Sam
and his successor Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), who were the first democratic national
leaders of Korea in the 1990s, had more direct influence on Korea's foreign policy
towards the PRC than Rho did. Rho as well as his predecessor Chon Doo Hwan (19801988) were military generals and seized the political power. Rho was a professional
Army general who was neither a knowledgeable politician nor an economist. In fact, Rho
Tae Woo was criticized by Kim Dae Jung for his lack of understanding of Korea's
economy. Rho's failure to manage the economy demonstrated he had no interest in
economy.41 The fact that Rho established a formal Sino-Korean bilateral economic
relationship created a foundation for the two countries' two-way trade, yet he did not
influence much of the bilateral trade policies. Therefore, the understanding of foreign
policy during the Kim Young Sam and the Kim Dae Jung administrations would provide
a more comprehensive analysis.
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Kim Young Sam
While Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung enjoy similar personal backgrounds,
their political views were quite different from one another. Both leaders were born in the
1920s. In fact, Kim Young Sam was born in December 1927 in Geoje, which is a city in
Southeastern Korea near Pusan. There is not much information about his childhood or
adolescence, yet it is generally known that he grew up in a common family in Southern
Korea. Even though he grew up in a small city, he succeeded in entering the Seoul
National University (SNU), which is the most prestigious university of Korea to major in
Philosophy. He graduated in 1952.42
Kim Young Sam began to work as the secretary of Premier Jang Tak Sang
(3K?ilffl). Afterwards, Kim Young Sam served in various political positions until 1980,
when he was banned from working as a politician. Kim Young Sam fought against the
military regime in order to lead Korea to democracy. For the military presidents, Kim
Young Sam was a barrier for their political success. Kim Young Sam was placed under
house arrest for his political activism from 1980 to 1981 and was put under house arrest
again between 1982 and 1983. During the second house arrest, he went on a hunger strike
for 23 days.43 It is difficult to find publications that discuss Kim Young Sam's struggle
against the Korean authoritarian and the military dictatorial government during the Cold
War. However, by looking at his hunger strike or the opposing struggle against the
regimes, it is drawn that Kim Young Sam experienced difficulties in his early political
life.
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Kim Dae Jung; The Early Life
Kim Dae Jung was born in 1924 and grew up as a son of a farmer in Hoo-Gwang,
which is a small village on the island off Mok-po city in Southwestern Korea. He
graduated from high school in 1943 and soon began to work for a marine company. By
the time Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945, Kim became a successful businessman
of a newspaper company until 195044, at which time he stepped into politics believing
that the only right form of government could save the country. In 1957, he was baptized
in the Catholic Church and received his catholic name Thomas Moore. His religious
belief as a catholic, which taught him about peaceful settlements and love, had played a
significant role when he was experiencing difficulties in his life.45 Despite the extreme
harshness as a politician under the authoritarian regimes, he was accompanied by his
belief and continuously pursued his career.
Until he became president in 1998, while fighting against authoritarian regimes of
South Korea such as Park Jung Hee's dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s, Kim Dae Jung
was put under house arrest, imprisoned, and sentenced to death. However, Kim spent a
great amount of his time in jail reading hundreds of books in history, philosophy,
economics, and literature. As can be seen in his prison letters, he was always
accompanied with his religious belief in every moment of difficulty of his life. His
religious belief led him to prolonged pursue of his political dreams.
Furthermore, his religion led him to a peaceful approach in pursuing his ambition
about bilateral trade later with China, which was reflected in the post-Kim Dae Jung
Sino-Korean bilateral negotiations. Kim Dae Jung believed that Korea should move on
44
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from the perception that China was a mother controller of South Korea. Even though the
world economic market increased the competition between countries, he chose a
cooperative approach rather than a hostile attitude towards China.
Throughout the early days in politics, Kim was faced with death four times. In
1950, he was captured by the communist army during the Korean War, but managed to
escape before he was shot. When he was running for the political office in 1971, there
was an attempt to assassinate him. After he exiled, secret agents from the Agency for
National Security Planning (commonly referred as to KCIA) kidnapped Kim in Tokyo in
1973; five days later, he was dropped in front of his house in South Korea.46 In 1980, in
the military court, he was sentenced to death by the new military regimes. Ethnic Koreans
living in the United States, Japan, Germany, and France as well as educated intellectuals
and politicians, started a massive movement to save his life. This resulted in a
commutation of the death penalty to life sentence. Chon Doo Hwan allowed Kim to exile
to the United States in 1982.
Kim Dae Jung's first period of exile in the United States was between October
1972 and August 1973. Park Chung Hee declared the Yusin Constitution, which amended
the previous constitution to allow run for a third presidential term. His opponent was Kim
Dae Jung. As a result, Park amended the constitution, and Kim left for the United States
in 1972. In January 1973, and Kim flew to Japan to convince relevant people to fight
against the current Yushin system of Korea. As his voice was stronger and stronger in
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Japan, he was kidnapped in August 1973.
No one can explain who planned the kidnapping because people who may have
been involved are not alive. Even the former president Park Chung Hee, who was also
involved in the kidnapping, was assassinated. The Korean National Intelligent Service
(NIS) created a task force, designed to investigate the Kim Dae Jung incident. It was
generally known that after Kim was kidnapped in Japan, he was thrown into the sea, but
rescued and then brought back to his place in Korea. In the interview in 1993, Kim says,
"Park Chung Hee ordered [my] assassination."48 Kim further explains, "[Park Chung
Hee] killed Kim Tak Sang who evoked the coup, forced to change the constitution, and
made Park become a president, yet when Kim was against Park, Park killed him. Park's
regime was such a government. ... I am sure that Park ordered my assassination."
It is important to acknowledge that the United States was deeply involved with
the rescue of Kim Dae Jung. In discussing the role of the United States government, Kim
states that when he moved to the United States, he was told by the Korean desk at the
U.S. state department that his case was considered utmost important. While in the midst
of a United Nations (UN) general meeting, the national security advisor, Henry
Kissinger, made an urgent call to his White House national security assistant. Since the
United Nations meeting was discussing Arab terrorism issues, the U.S. linked the UN
discussion with Kim's fate. Harvard professor Reischauer [Edwin O. Reischauer] and
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Keohane [Robert O. Keohane] contacted their old colleague, Henry Kissinger to assure
that the United States would take the necessary measures to save Kim Dae Jung.50
American support influenced Kim's educational experience in the United States.
The Nixon Administration and others believed that Kim held the key to democratizing
Korea. Thus the U.S. Government considered it extremely important to allow Kim to
come to the United States and establish a Korean human rights institute. Even though
Park Chung Hee was fully cooperating with the United States, Park was a dictator who
contributed to the delay of Korea's democracy. For Washington, Kim Dae Jung
becoming a president could bring about Korea democracy. Kim may have regarded the
United States more optimistically than Park Chung Hee, and thus was willing to accept
American influence. Although difficult to prove, this was the overall situation that might
have influenced Kim Dae Jung when he was appointed a visiting fellow at Harvard
University in 1983. his study at Harvard will be further discussed in the later section.
During his imprisonment, Kim composed Prison Writings, which is a collection
of his letters to his family while he was imprisoned. It is often stated that Kim studied the
economy extensively during his incarceration. Yet, in his letters to his family, Kim does
not mention studying economics or his economic views. This study thus turns to his
writings while at Harvard as the key to understanding the foundation of his economic
views, which influenced Sino-Korean trade as well as domestic economic policy.
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung
Both Korean presidents share similar personal backgrounds, but there are
differences. Both of them were born in small cities in Southern Korea in the 1920s. Even
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though they were directly exposed to politics while growing up, both of the former
presidents entered politics during their twenties. While Korea was under the authoritarian
regime of Park Chong Hee (1962-1980) and under the military dictatorial rulers of Chon
Doo Hwan (1980-1988) and Rho Tae Woo (1988-1993), both Kim Young Sam and Kim
Dae Jung fought against the government.
There was and still is tension between them, yet there was a point that they allied
with each other against the regime. In fact, "the two have been major rivals since 1971,
when Kim Dae Jung was selected as the opposition candidate for president." Yet, they
were once political partners who pursued Korea's democratization during the Cold War.
In Kim Dae Jung's speech in May 29, 1979, Kim Dae Jung called Kim Young Sam a
companion.52 Kim Dae Jung gave a speech in order to endorse Kim Young Sam as a
presidential candidate. By expressing his support for Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung
repeatedly called Kim Young Sam a friend. In 1985, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung
both served as the head of the Democratic Party, and Kim Dae Jung opened a new
political party with Kim Young Sam in April 1987.53
They are, nonetheless, different from one another. While Kim Young Sam entered
SNU after high school, Kim Dae Jung became a businessman. Compared to Kim Dae
Jung, Kim Young Sam enjoyed better social and political connections as he went to the
most prestigious college in Korea, which educates a large number of successful political
and business leaders. It was easier for Kim Young Sam to make connections with
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distinguished politicians through the alumni network. On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung
was a businessman after graduating high school. He ran a marine company in Southern
Korea, but decided to run for a local politician and eventually became one of the most
important political figures of the country.
They may have shared similar views on the current political regime, but
unfortunately only few publications or speeches outlining Kim Young Sam's view are
available. Kim Young Sam may have agreed with Kim Dae Jung in the political issues
during the Cold War. Kim Dae Jung admits "President Park Chung Hee's regime made a
sustainable progress through centralized and highly controlled economic planning,"54 yet
vigorously criticized the poorly-structured political system.55 In fact, he indicated the
causing factor of Korea's economic downhill in the 1990s resulted from the extensive
government intervention as shown in the examples of Chongkyong Yuchak (politicseconomy cohesion).56 Yet, again, these materials are somewhat sparse.
The fact that Kim Dae Jung is only three years younger than Kim Young Sam
shows that both of the politicians have lived in the same era, witnessing and experiencing
the same political, economic, and social historical events and incidents. One of the factors
that may have caused different views of the former presidents might be their different
educational backgrounds. Since Kim Young Sam entered college after high school, he
may have seen and analyzed any social phenomena through the tools he acquired from
SNU. On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung may have approached Korea as a businessman
and an ambitious politician rather than a scholastic approach.
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After extensive research, it was clear that Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung
both understood globalization had taken place at the end of the twentieth century. Even
though they both regarded globalization as significant, these views were different from
one another. Both of the former presidents were supporters of each other during the Cold
War era, yet the different view towards globalization may have formed at that time. Kim
Dae Jung, while waiting for his execution and spending years in jail, studied history,
philosophy, economics, and literature through books sent by his family.57 When the list of
books Kim Dae Jung read was released to the public later on, it greatly surprised
Koreans. His time in the jail shows that Kim Dae Jung has accumulated knowledge on
economics during this time. Furthermore, when Kim Dae Jung was exiled from his home
country, he spent a year at Harvard University between 1983 and 1984 as a visiting
scholar.
As the period in the United States was crucial to Kim's views, an analysis of Kim
Dae Jung's views of the world must focus on his time at Harvard University between
1983 and 1984. As a visiting fellow, Kim Dae Jung was not required to complete any
work, yet he decided to write a book on Korea's economy, which was completed in 1984.
According to him, a lack of materials did not allow him to extensively examine Korea's
economy, yet he was able to publish a revised edition in 1995 after returning to Korea.
The book was not a Master's Thesis or a required final project. Kim Dae Jung has been
writing over twenty books since the 1960s, so that he had the tendency to write books in
order to express his opinions. The book published at Harvard University was one of them.
This thesis questions what influenced Kim Dae Jung while he was at Harvard. Had he
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taken any political economic classes at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard?
Did Kim Dae Jung frequently meet any distinguished scholars who may have impacted
on Kim's view on political economy of Korea? What is the catalysis for Kim to have
such economic view of Korea? In order to answer these questions, it was necessary to
interview executive committee members associated with Kim Dae Jung's book.
Kim Dae Jung at Harvard University
Kim Dae Jung struggled for democracy and human rights in South Korea and East Asia.
His Sunshine Policy, towards North Korea, which was originated from the Aesop's fables,
brought him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001.
Kim Dae Jung was well known as a human rights advocate, yet he was also a
knowledgeable economist, whose previous work influenced his actions as president. In
the acceptance speech of the 15thROK presidential nomination in May 1997,59 Kim says,
"In the parliamentary, [I am] recognized by myself and others to be an economic expert.
At the world's most prestigious school Harvard University, I published a book called
Mass-Participatory Economy". His reference to his book during the speech implies that
his publication at Harvard might have been the fundamental guideline of his economic
policy. Even though it was the presidential candidate acceptance speech, Kim
emphasized that he had completed a book at Harvard. This further implies Kim's
confidence in the book as it had received the "Good Housekeeping seal of approval" from
the Harvard faculty. It is necessary to analyze what Kim discusses in his book, and
before that, what shaped his economic view at Harvard University.
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In order to find out Kim's academic experiences at Harvard, several attempts
were made. This thesis contacted relevant scholars at Harvard, including the executive
committee members of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University
mentioned in Kim's book, such as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye. However, it was
impossible to interview scholars who knew about Kim Dae Jung's experiences at Harvard
University. This study must thus focus on Kim Dae Jung's Harvard publication. The
following chapter discusses how both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung perceived
globalization.
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CHAPTER III

PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS ON SEGYEHWA

Kim Young Sam's View on Segyehwa
Rho Tae Woo's successor Kim Young Sam began his five year term in February
of 1993. Even though the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, Korea had
experienced the authoritarian regime and then the military regimes until 1992. Kim
Young Sam was the first democratically elected president. During his inaugural speech,
he revealed his ambitions for international and domestic policies.
Dear Fellow Citizens:
Globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a firstclass country in the 21 st century. This is because the60 I revealed my
plan for globalization and the government has concentrated all of its
energy in forging ahead with it. It is aimed at realizing globalization
in all sectors - politics, foreign affairs, economy, society, education,
culture, and sports. To this end, it is necessary to enhance our
viewpoints, way of thinking, system, and practices to the world-class
level.61
As an experienced politician who had fought against the authoritarian regime and
the military dictatorship, Kim Young Sam had witnessed Korea's dramatic economic
development and its path toward democracy in the 1980s. As the first national leader
elected by democratic vote, Kim did not have to justify his presidency as other presidents
did previously. Kim Young Sam clearly understood that globalization had taken place
throughout the world. Unlike his predecessors, the SNU graduate was capable of
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perceiving this international economic trend.
After close analysis of the speech, it is clear that Kim Young Sam wished for
Korea to obtain a more advanced status in the world. Kim Young Sam believed that
accepting globalization and moving forward would enable Korea to get more attention
from the international community. In 1993, the Korean government no longer considered
domestic poverty eradication as its top national priority; Korea was no longer a poor
Third World country, in part due to Park Chung Hee's economic reform in 1962. In
particular, the International Olympics in 1988 helped Korea understand that it needed to
improve its international viewpoints, systems, and mind set in order to reach the world
class level that Kim Young Sam articulated in his speech.
As communication technology significantly developed and businesses increased
communication, the world economy globalized. Seoul's rapid economic development by
itself was not a factor that led Korea to become an "advanced" country. This new trend
required new behaviors, yet Koreans were not ready for globalization.62 Koreans earned
higher incomes and could afford higher levels of education. Yet, there was a lack of
recognition of international issues among Koreans. Kim Young Sam hoped that Korea
would understand the economic trend and would adjust to the new international
environment. During his term, segyehwa was aimed to
drastically change Korea's existing political and socio-economic
institutions to make segyehwa policy is to enable Korea to make
greater contributions to the advancement of all humanity by actively
pursuing fair competition combined with ever closer worldwide
cooperation.63
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For Kim Young Sam, globalization required modifications of policies, development of
human resources and transformation of rules and mindsets in order to become one of the
leading nations in the world. Kim Young Sam himself succeeded in pursuing
globalization.64 The rapid growing domestic economy, which developed based on
outwardly oriented trade, provided Korea with an opportunity to experience higher
standards of living. Yet Koreans lacked an understanding of international issues and
foreign societies. It was urgent for Kim Young Sam to encourage Koreans to become
aware of the emergence of the world economy.
Based on the presidential speeches and government reviews of Kim Young Sam's
five-year presidential term, it is clear that segyehwa was a top agenda item. During the
APEC conference in Sidney, Australia, Kim Young Sam revealed his plans on segyehwa,
and the committee was established on January 21, 1995.65 Kim Young Sam suggested
implementing 54 agendas in 'Prospect and Strategy for Globalization'. Korea revised or
enacted 53 laws by the segyehwa committee.66 Kim Young Sam suggested a concrete
plan for joining the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, and this raised Koreans' awareness of segyehwa.

As

part of Kim Young Sam's globalization, Korea's membership in the WTO enabled it to
access other member countries and meet international norms for trade. This access and
modification of trade policy gave Korea opportunities to build relationships with
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advanced countries such as those in the European Union. Through building friendships
with more developed countries, Korea was able to gain more global recognition.
Another result of segyehwa was the diversification of trading partners. Until the
late 1980s, the United States was the largest, perhaps the dominant, trade partner for
Seoul. Seoul heavily relied on the United States not only for military aid but also for
economic benefits. Not only was the United States its top export destination, but also the
biggest importer. However, Korea's trade with the United States began to diminish in the
early 1990s. According to the WTO, "exports to developed economies were steadily
diminishing in relation to total exports, while shipments to developing countries were
increasing amid booming demand in fast-growing economies such as China and the
ASEAN members."68
Beginning in the 1990s, the U.S.-Korea economic alliance encountered problems.
From 1961 to 1973, "the volume of exports increased at an annual rate of 35 per cent,
increasing its share of GDP from less than 1 percent to 24 per cent."69 Korea's per capita
GDP from 1965 to 1990 "increased at a 7 percent annual rate" while OECD per capita
GPD annual growth was less than 3 percent.70 As Korea's economy advanced,
Washington began to apply higher stands for U.S.-Korea bilateral trade.71 Washington's
demand for higher quality goods and labor efficiency caused friction, thus discouraging
the Korean government from enthusiastically collaborating with the United States. At the
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same time, the geographical distance was no longer a barrier to international trade and
investment. Korea had also other potential international trading partners.
Instead of concentrating its exports and imports mainly on the United States,
globalization helped Kim Young Sam to realize the existence of his neighbors. The
development of the Chinese economy, which had been growing exponentially for over a
decade, could have been an outstanding opportunity for Kim Young Sam to take Korea
one step further up toward engaging in the international community. Kim Young Sam
wanted to build a strong relationship with China because of its vast market of the Chinese
economy with 1.2 billion people, cheap labor, and its geographic convenience. Kim
Young Sam's belief resulted in the creation of a trade regime with China.
When Kim Young Sam made a presidential visit to China in 1994, he decided to
establish a Sino-Korean industrial cooperation committee.72 After the presidential summit
in 1994, Seoul and Beijing held six annual ministerial conferences for industrial
collaboration. As a result, China and Korea enthusiastically promoted industrial policies,
advanced scientific technology, and established an energy resource alliance. The two
countries also created a network among business sectors, research institutes, and
governments. During Kim Young Sam's term, the collaboration between Seoul and
Beijing was centered around industrial sectors. These achievements provided a
foundation for business sectors in both Korea and China to share skills and transfer
technology from Korea to China.
It is clear that Kim Young Sam's emphasis on globalization contributed to the
normalization of the Sino-Korean relationship. The two countries, which barely had any
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contact during the Cold War era, engaged with one another. For Koreans, China was no
longer a communist regime, but a land of opportunity for Korea's future economic
exchange. However, this study encountered an issue related to limited materials of Kim
Young Sam's view on segyehwa. After the inauguration speech and presidential summit,
Kim Young Sam ceased to mention segyehwa, which prevents this study from analyzing
his position in depth. His presidential summit with President Jiang Zemin (tOil J5;)
facilitated Sino-Korean trade by creating a committee. Yet, it is not clear how Kim
Young Sam changed the trade policies for Korean sectors in order to create a climate that
helped trade sectors.
By late 1997, all of Asia was in deep economic trouble. During this Asian
financial crisis, the Korea state encountered a series of chaebol bankruptcies. This
chaebol, which is a group of "large conglomerates linking many individual companies an average of 27 in 1997 - that are diversified across a wide range of industries."
Inflation skyrocketed, making it difficult for householders to manage their budget.
Korean currency also fluctuated so much that business sectors suffered from currency
instability. President Kim Young Sam used the crisis to force Korea into the global world.
To make Korea competitive abroad, Korea implemented various reforms in the business
and government sectors and also fundamentally changed their world views. Yet, by the
end of his term, the Korean people did not believe Kim to be capable of leading the
nation.
Kim Young Sam's view on globalization contributed to the diversification of
Korea's trading partners, especially with China. However, there is little written evidence
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available on his opinions about globalization or China. Kim may have been well trained
academically, but he lacked the knowledge to apply this to the real world. Sino-Korean
trade gradually increased, yet Kim failed to provide incentives to business sectors
working with China. He left office with all the blames for his inability to manage national
economy and to handle all the presidential tasks, leaving them to his successor Kim Dae
Jung in February of 1998.
Kim Dae Jung's View on Segyehwa
Inaugurated in February 1998, Kim Dae Jung assumed responsibility for the
economic crisis, which was the most urgent task passed to him from the previous
administration. Hanbo Steel's bankruptcy on January 23,1998 resulted in a 4 trillion won
debt.74 By the time Kim Dae Jung entered the presidential office in February, Korean
chaebol and smaller businesses had suffered a series of bankruptcies. Unlike previous
leaders, Kim Dae Jung deeply understood Korea's economy. He was capable of
analyzing the origin of the economic crisis and understood the mistakes of the previous
leaders such as Rho Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam. An analysis of Kim Dae Jung's
publications and his personal interviews provide a better picture of how his personal view
on globalization had influenced the Sino-Korean bilateral economic relationship. This
study analyzed Kim Dae Jung's publication, Prison Writings. This book was translated
into English, but the original Korean version is more accurate.
By the time he entered the president office, Koreans already understood that
segyehwa had become deeply ingrained within Korean society. It was no longer a strange
foreign concept, but it was a gateway to the global community. While Kim Young Sam
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believed that segyehwa generally would take a country to one step further toward an
advanced position in the international community, Kim Dae Jung presented a more
specific, detailed concept of his own regarding segyehwa. Even before the 1998
presidential election, Kim revealed his view on segyehwa in his nomination acceptance
speech.
Kim Dae Jung believed that the world was in transition from the industrially
oriented market to the "intellectual century." The 21 st century was a time for
globalization and Korean localization (equivalent to American anti-federalism), in which
the state was no longer the key organizing principle. In the presidential acceptance speech,
Kim Dae Jung argued that he would be a president whom all Koreans would be proud of
and that he would lead Korea through segyehwa. Kim Dae Jung also promised to be a
salesman for Korea's economic relationship with other countries. His emphasis on
segyehwa and his knowledge as a businessman directly impacted the Sino-Korean
economic relationship during his presidential term.
In his speech in February of 1998, Kim Dae Jung addressed how the information
revolution had created one international community, making the transition from the times
based on nationality to the times based on the world76 In other words, the spread of
information technology as well as communication transformed the world; the world was
previously based on nationality, yet now the concept of the international community
predominated. Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung stressed globalization; Kim Dae
Jung discussed the development of the international phenomenon and its driving tools.
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Kim Young Sam's opinion on globalization simply focused on the international
economic phenomenon. In contrast, Kim Dae Jung articulated that technology was
driving the advancement of globalization bringing globalization to Korea.
Kim Dae Jung strongly believed that the competitiveness of the world market was
increasing among countries; whereas Kim Young Sam only argued that Korea needed to
adopt the new world trend and renovate its internal policies in order to become
comparable to other economic powers, Kim Dae Jung suggested a possible way for Korea
to catch up to the rapid development of the international economy. Kim Dae Jung reveals
his personal view further in his book. He says, "...we [Korea] cannot be miserly in our
investment in technological innovations and the basic science. If we truly aspire to the
status of an advanced nation, we must be bold in our investment in science and
technology."77
Information and development of technology resulted in an increase in interactions
among countries. Due to communication technology, countries were able to exchange
information and transfer knowledge and technology. It became easy to see how other
nations manage their economy or obtain crucial information on the international market.
These factors not only facilitated international communication, but also made it difficult
to keep negotiation strategies in trade, industrial technology or technical know-how
confidentially from other competitive countries.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the differences between Kim Young Sam
and Kim Dae Jung were caused by their academic training. The two former presidents,
age wise, were basically of the same generation. They experienced the same historical
events such as the Korean War and both encountered harsh political lives, yet their
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academic experiences were not similar. Kim Young Sam never formally studied
economics or international relations in school. Since he majored in philosophy, it was
likely that he was not knowledgeable in economics. In contrast, Kim Dae Jung had
extensively studied economics in jail. His one-year study at Harvard University may have
enabled him to better understand international economic relations.
Compared to Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung had much more international
experience, thus making a further difference between his view and Kim Young Sam's
opinions on globalization. Kim Dae Jung spent several years in the United States when he
was exiled from Korea twice. He spent a year as a visiting fellow at Harvard University
from 1983 to 1984. After he came back to Korea, he lost two presidential elections. He
received a Ph.D. in political science from Moscow University in 1992. He announced his
retirement as a politician in December of 1992 and flew to England to work as a visiting
scholar at Cambridge University on January 16, 1993. While he was exiled and was
studying in England, he was provided with opportunities to meet international scholars
and distinguished politicians. Kim Dae Jung widened his world view and learned
innovative tools with which to examine international phenomena, thus deepening his
understanding of the international political economy and his view on Korea's economy
under democracy.
Kim Dae Jung's View on Economy
The spread of the internet as a result of communication technology evolution
strengthened globalization. Kim Dae Jung believed that through investing technology and
education, Seoul could be the 8th largest economic power from the 13th .78 Because the
Korean economy was heavily based on human resources, he claimed that the quality of
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human resources as production inputs could be improved through education. Kim's
emphasis on technology had a fundamental implication for his policy on Sino-Korean
bilateral trade, which is further discussed in the following section.
Before discussing how Kim Dae Jung played a central role in formulating trading
policies, it is necessary to discuss his personal view on China, which greatly affected
Seoul's relationship with Beijing. In his Prison Writings, Kim Dae Jung admitted that he
was not knowledgeable about China. Even though he lacked knowledge about China's
bureaucratic political system, Kim Dae Jung had a tool to analyze international political
economy. He knew not only about China's rise as an economic power, but also about the
possible ways to take advantage of China's economic growth. Kim Dae Jung clearly was
aware of China's ability to provide cheap labor to foreign investors, which Korea was
lacking in the 1990s. The Korean labor market was relatively cheap and competitive
compared to advanced countries such as Japan, yet it was not as attractive as the Chinese
market to foreign businesses. Not only did China continuously develop its economy, but
Beijing's cheap labor and cheap land could benefit Seoul. Accordingly, Kim Dae Jung
eagerly reformed the domestic economy and implemented his plans for Korea's trade.
Liberalization became the key factor during the Kim Dae Jung administration and it
created a better climate for Sino-Korean bilateral trade.
Kim Dae Jung: Liberalization in Economy
The World Trade Organization Review from 1996 to 2000 indicates that Kim Dae
Jung's view on market liberalization was directly applied to Korea's economic reform
after the 1997 Asian Crisis. Since the membership in the OECD and the WTO, the
Korean government committed to liberalizing its financial sectors, "strengthened its
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commitment to market openness and stepped up measures to enhance market access."
As Kim Dae Jung stressed the importance of liberalization in his book, economic
liberalization was the top agenda in the Kim Dae Jung's administration as well as
specialization of economic sectors. Kim believed the role of government was to correct
mistakes and failures. Kim's belief was directly carried over to his economic reforms.
The WTO Review of the Republic of Korea's economy stated, "... the [Asian] Crisis
prompted Korea to accelerate liberalization and market opening voluntarily."80
After implementing a series of reforms, Kim Dae Jung's liberalization of the
economy was followed by globalization of Korea's economic sectors. Upon the
inauguration, it was an urgent task for Kim Dae Jung to correct the market failure. Korea
was experiencing the worst economic crisis since the Korean War. The imports and
exports were rapidly decreasing, and the general public was experiencing high prices of
goods. Previously, it was difficult for small sectors and foreign investors to enter the
Korean market due to chaebols' dominance of the market. Kim Dae Jung presented his
belief that in democratic society, the public should participate in the market. Thus, unlike
previous administrations, Kim Dae Jung prevented chaebols from having much control
over the domestic market and encouraged small and medium size firms to actively
participate in the market. It was also necessary to open its market to foreign investors in
order for Korea's trade to bounce back.
To facilitate the trade, the Kim Dae Jung government modified the function of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), making the institution more efficient in
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trade policy and the implementation of the policies. Kim Dae Jung's reforms permitted
foreign companies to easily integrate into the Korean market. Kim Dae Jung's
liberalization of financial sectors promoted foreign investment significantly, making the
Korean market more accessible for foreign direct investors. Korea allowed foreign banks
to establish subsidiaries in April 1998, allowed "foreigners to purchase all money market
instruments such as CPs, CDs, and RPs, and removed ceilings on foreigners' stock
market investments with the exception of state-owned enterprises" in May 2008. Seoul
no

allowed foreign firms to list on the Korean Stock Exchange in July 2000. Foreign firms
began to branch out in the Korean market. For example, General Motors took over
Daewoo, which went to bankruptcy, and manufactured automobiles.
As soon as Kim Dae Jung assumed power, he focused on the correction of the
market failure by liberalizing the Korean economy. Kim carried out a series of reforms as
a commitment to the membership of the OECD. The reforms provided foreign investors
as well as domestic investors with more freedom, making it easier to access the Korean
market. The procedure of foreign investment in Korea became much easier and simpler,
so that Korea was able to attract foreign direct investors to bring capital, thus contributing
to the recovery of the domestic economy. The economic reforms showed that Kim Dae
Jung handled the economic crisis by maximizing the possible benefits of Korea's
segyehwa. Korea needed to prepare for the competitive market economy in order to
successfully survive the economic crisis. Instead of isolating its market from foreign
investors, Kim Dae Jung's segyehwa resulted in the modification of trade policies.
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China's path to membership in the WTO and the emergence of the globalized
economy also stimulated Kim Dae Jung to open Korea's market to foreign firms and
increase trade with its neighbors. Korea, which has little natural resources, has pursued
outward trade since 1962. Kim understood that the collapse of the Berlin Wall helped
democracy and capitalism become dominant political and economic ideologies in
northeast Asia. China's vast market with 1.3 billion consumers could be Korea's major
export destination. China's path toward capitalism provided an opportunity for Kim to
persuade the Chinese to collaborate with Koreans. Besides the domestic economic change,
Kim Dae Jung took the next step as a business man by making a visit to China. Kim's
belief that globalization made world trade more competitive might have motivated him to
make a presidential visit to China in 1999. Kim's visit to China became a significant
point at which both Kim and Jiang Zemin built a friendship and developed mutual trust.
While visiting China, Kim repeatedly emphasized the prospect of a Sino-Korean
relationship.
Kim's presidential speeches and official meetings with Korean and Chinese
businesses demonstrated that the enhancement of Sino-Korean friendship was the top
agenda in his economic policies. First, when he held a social gathering with 300 ethnic
Koreans in China, he said that the Chinese economy would be the best or at least the
second best in the world, although it was the 7th largest at that time.85 He also asked them
to enthusiastically participate in strengthening Sino-Korean relations since the two
countries would cooperate in many different sectors [from economic to environmental
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issues].

On the same day, Kim invited 13 of his close friends and said again that China

and Korea would hold hands and cooperate with one another in all different sectors,
including the economy, politics, foreign policy, culture, and human resource exchange.
President Kim again reemphasized the prospect of a Sino-Korean relationship during a
speech at Peking University.
Kim's continuous effort to convince the Chinese government, business sectors,
and Chinese college students of his ideas demonstrated that there would be a great
amount of cooperation between China and Korea. Kim regarded China as a fundamental
partner that would help Korea recover its domestic economic failure from the 1997 crisis
and move on a path to be a competitive economy in the globalized world. Kim Dae Jung
previously saw China's competence in the world market as a rising power. It was no
longer inevitable that Korea would stay disengaged with China. Since Beijing was in the
process of officially joining the WTO and its GDP was remarkably increasing, it was
necessary to be cooperative with China for economic profits during this time. During the
lunch with Sino-Korean economists, Kim said, "Chinese and Korean businessmen and
economists: Sino-Korean economic cooperation is extremely necessary at this moment.
First, economic globalization brings the globalization of a critical situation and we need
to prepare for new [economic] challenges."87
During the interview with Premier Zhu Rongji (^c!#S), while discussing
economic cooperation expansion, President Kim played the role of a salesman who
addressed Korean companies' difficulties [in trading with China] and reassured Zhu. In
the afternoon, Kim Dae Jung invited 200 Chinese and Korean economists and held a
86
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consultation meeting on the current critical situation. Kim again highlighted the necessity
of Sino-Korean exchange and investment expansion. Additionally, during the meeting
with the mayor of Shanghai, Kim Dae Jung asked the mayor to support Korean
companies when participating in the development project of Shanghai.
President Kim's state visit to China shows his enthusiasm about Korea's
diversification of its trading partnership with China. While holding multiple conferences
and speeches in China, the president confidently reassured associated affiliates that China
would be one of Korea's important economic partners. His repeated emphasis on bilateral
collaboration in various sectors showed his confidence in the prosperous future of SinoKorean bilateral trade. Kim seemed to build mutual companionships with Beijing.
Perhaps, Kim Dae Jung did not pursue a meaningless partnership, but tried to find a way
for the two countries to integrate with one another deeply.
The 1998 presidential summit was the only official meeting between China's and
Korea's leaders. However, Kim Dae Jung and Jiang held meetings while participating in
international conferences. In September 1999, both Kim and Jiang attended the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In September 2000, the two presidents also held
a meeting at the United Nations Millennium Summit. They also met in October 2002
during the APEC conference in Shanghai, and met again at the APEC conference in
Mexico. The presidential office did not reveal the outcomes of the presidential
discussions, yet it is important to understand that the two national leaders were willing to
build friendships with one another.
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Policies Towards Sectors during the Kim Dae Jung Administration
The analysis of Kim's view on globalization and his presidential activities
demonstrates that segyehwa was the cause of the economic reforms in sectors, thus
eventually impacting the Sino-Korean economic relationship between 1998 and 2003.
The Blue House - the Korean equivalent of the White House - understood that it had to
revise the policies toward chaebols. Yet, the most important key of the economic reform
of the Blue House was "the emphasis on promoting 'venture businesses' - small,
technology-based firms characterized by high risk and the potential for high returns."89
Kim Dae Jung points out the lack of Korea's investment in Research and Development
(R&D). Kim stated, "as of 1990, total public and private investment in R&D was a
meager 1.9 percent of GNP ... it topped 2 percent for the first time in 1991 (2.1
percent)."90 Compared to the United States, which spent about 3 percent for R&D, 2.1
percent was little investment. The president believed there was a need to increase
investment to 3 percent in order to facilitate research on technology.
According to Hoe Hun Chung, the Kim administration continuously invested in
education and technology as well as a high level of the government investment in the
venture industry in the 1990s. 1 Many venture firms were established by young, advanced
degree holders such as university professors or researchers, who majored in engineering
or science. The increased the number of venture firms in the Information Technology
sector resulted in the increase of Korea's trade. A majority of venture businesses were in
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the computer or telecommunication equipment sectors, thus contributing to the
information technology industry.
President Kim's view on technology as Korea's future major export results in a
significant advancement of technology. Beginning with Samsung's semiconductors,
Korean technology sectors produced high quality products. Technology enhancement
sectors have important implications on Korea's exports to China. The next chapter
analyzes the historical revolution of the Sino-Korean bilateral relationship using
qualitative methods. It will highlight how the presidents' attempt to enhance the SinoKorean relationship caused the distortion of the diplomatic affiliation between China and
Korea.
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CHAPTER IV

SINO-KOREAN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, 2000-2007

The previous chapter examined Kim Young Sam's and Kim Dae Jung's slightly
different perspectives on segyehwa and their efforts to globalize Korea. Even though Kim
Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung both were the same generations and shared their political
views as companions in the 1980s against the military regime, Kim Young Sam and Kim
Dae Jung had different policies on Korea's globalization because of their educational
backgrounds and international experiences. Kim Dae Jung was much more enthusiastic
about playing a role as a national business leader and continuously implemented the
liberalization of Korean economy in order to recover the domestic market and develop
Korea's global trading system with China. Given the differences in policies, this chapter
examines the impact of presidential efforts in the course of Sino-Korea trade.
Sino-Korean Historical Relationship
By looking at the outcomes of presidential summits, it is clear that the two
countries have made much progress over time, even though the diplomatic relationship
has existed only about 15 years. The Sino-Korean bilateral relationship gradually
increased and rapidly developed when Kim Dae Jung made a state visit to Beijing in
1998. Kim Dae Jung's ambition to enhance the Sino-Korean relationship into
companionship boosted Sino-Korean trade dramatically. Not only did bilateral trade
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increase, but presidential efforts encouraged a greater willingness to collaborate for
mutual economic benefits. This section examines the evolution of the Sino-Korean
historical relationship by conducting qualitative analysis, and then it looks at the same
issue via statistical analysis. The analysis of Sino-Korean bilateral history shows that
there are watershed moments in it. Along with the three important timelines, the
collaborative bilateral approach in resolving the Goguryeo dispute and the discussion on
Free Trade Agreement explain the evolution of this relationship.
China and Korea have shared diplomatic, economic, and historical relationships
for more than three thousand years. Both countries fought against the Japanese Empire in
the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Yet, the Republic of Korea sided
with the United States during the Korean War. Mao Zedong's seizure of political power
and declaration of the PRC in 1949, formed the distance between China and Korea.
During the Cold War, there was hardly any contact between the PRC and the ROK. As
Kim Dae Jung admits in Prison Writings his lack of knowledge about the Chinese
governmental system was shared by many distinguished political figures in Korea.
China's isolationism made it even more difficult for Korea to negotiate with it. China and
North Korea were in an alliance, so Koreans regarded China as a threat to regional
security.
The collapse of communism after the fall of the Berlin Wall, China's acceptance
of capitalism, and Korea's economic growth all played a role in making it easy for Korea
to open a door to China for a diplomatic relationship in the early 1990s. Rho Tae Woo's
establishment of a Sino-Korean relationship in 1992 normalized the diplomatic situation,
creating a better climate for both countries in interacting with one another. Right after
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this establishment, the PRC and the ROK agreed on science and technology cooperation.
The Sino-Korean bilateral accord, signed on September 30,1992, became effective on
October 30, 1992. The two governments agreed to establish an economic, trade and
technical cooperation committee. These agreements which took place right after the
treaty showed Beijing and Seoul were actively engaged with one another in normalizing
bilateral trade.
Rho Tae Woo was soon followed by Kim Young Sam in 1993. Between 1992 and
1996, the ROK and the PRC named the relationship the "Preferred Cooperative
Relationship,"94 meaning that the two countries were more than willing to cooperate
through bilateral negotiations. In fact, approximately 130,000 Chinese and Koreans were
exchanged as a result. Still, at the beginning of the relationship, there was not a
significantly remarkable interaction between the two states. Kim Young Sam made a
state visit to China on March 20 through 26 in 1994.95 Kim Young Sam and Jiang Zemin
established an industrial cooperation committee, which was further developed by Kim
Dae Jung during his visit to China in 1998.96 The bilateral cooperation, in fact, was
accelerated during the Kim Dae Jung administration, especially after this visit.
When the former ROK President, Kim Dae Jung, visited China on November 12,
1998, Kim Dae Jung and Jiang Zemin decided to enhance the Sino-Korean relationship
toward "Cooperative Companionship." The two presidents decided to increase the
exchange of government and parliamentary party officials, cooperate on security for the
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Korean peninsula and northeast Asian region, and collaborate for Asian economic
recovery, economic growth, and alliances in other fields. Under these agreements, Kim
and Jiang drafted, signed, and publicly presented Sino-Korean bilateral agreements the
following day.97 The bilateral agreement included the expansion of trade to create a better
climate. The five point agreement was not released to the public, but parts of the
agreement were referenced in various official publications. The two presidents discussed
not only the enhancement of regional economic cooperation but also strengthening a
companionship.
Kim Dae Jung's presidential visit to China resulted in the advancement of the
bilateral relationship between Korea and China. Whereas Kim Young Sam's bilateral
relationship was based on trade and human resource exchange, Kim Dae Jung's policy
toward China was more inclusive. Kim Dae Jung as a president did not hesitate taking the
role of a businessman for the advancement of the Sino-Korean bilateral relationship. Kim
Dae Jung considered this relationship with China as a significant factor in preparing for
the globalized economy and did not pursue a limited bilateral relationship. In order for
trade to further develop, it was necessary to collaborate in many different aspects with
China since other potential political issues might affect mutually beneficial economic
interests. Limiting the presidential discussion only to economies would not entirely
provide a better circumstance for Korean sectors to facilitate bilateral trade. It was
necessary to discuss various aspects which might positively stimulate Sino-Korean trade.
Kim Dae Jung might have understood that there could be many potential issues
between Seoul and Beijing as they developed their bilateral relationship. Since China and
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Korea did not interact with one another during the Cold War due to the ideological
differences, it was expected that there could be some potential friction in trade. In order
to prevent a possible problem from adversely affecting companionship, it was important
to be willing to exchange high government officials for better communication. When
PRC Premier Zhu Rongji (5fct§36) visited Korea, the two countries established a
committee of investment cooperation between ministers in order to promote bilateral
investment and reduce barriers. Until November 2005, the two countries held four
meetings. China and Korea discussed the Chinese electricity market (power plant,
electrical power, new renewable energy, etc), joint resource development and ways to
QO

resolve issues of Korean investing companies. This preventative action would help the
two countries facilitate trade policies, making it much easier for the financial sectors to
interact with China. Moreover, his belief on the importance of technology also played a
significant role in the Sino-Korean bilateral agreements.
China regulated foreign companies by dividing them into four separate categories.
The four categories vary from sectors promoted by the government to sectors that
prohibited foreign firms from investing. China allows microelectronic technology,
machines, the electronics, and automobile components to invest in the domestic market.
The Chinese policy met Kim Dae Jung's passion for the development of technology.
Korea developed technology that encouraged foreigners to invest in China. It was an
outstanding opportunity for Korean firms to expand their businesses in China. Since Kim
Dae Jung and Jiang Zemin agreed to cooperate in the financial sectors, Korean finance,
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insurance, and stock markets have branched into the Chinese market. As of September
2005, there are 22 Korean banks in China including 16 branches, 5 offices, and 1
corporation." Furthermore, after the agreement to create an industrial cooperation
committee during Kim Young Sam's visit to China in 1994, Kim Dae Jung agreed to
industrial projects including the development of the financial sector, CDMA (code
division multiple access), nuclear plants, and express trains. When Rho Moo Hyun
visited China in July 2003, China and Korea decided to pursue a industrial project that
includes IT (Information Technology), future high technology (BT, NT), the electric
utility industry, Chinese resource development, and financial collaboration.100
This bilateral pact has significantly assisted the Korean financial sector by
increasing its exports to China. The industrial project implies that through the exchange
of the commodities associated with the project, there would be potential exchanges such
as product segments and human resources. To transfer IT from Korea to China, it was
necessary for the companies to send experts to China and cooperate with the local
Chinese employers and employees. By importing Korean experts, the Chinese industrial
sectors benefited from Korean technology, thus further improving and building
friendships among sectors under government assistance. Kim Dae Jung's program not
only promoted Sino-Korean bilateral trade, but also contributed an improved
collaborative climate between China and Korea, thus implementing his ambition about
technology in trade. After the Chinese and Korean governments built the cooperation
channel, Korean IT sectors actively exported to China including Hong Kong. The amount
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of investment reached $24 billion, resulting in Korea gaining a trade profit of $13 billion.
The major export commodities to China are cellular phones, semiconductors, TFT-LCD
and IT.101
In February 2003, Kim Dae Jung was succeeded by Rho Moo Hyun. Rho Moo
Hyun, who was a former human right lawyer, did not enjoy as sophisticated a knowledge
of economies as his predecessor. By the time he arrived in the Blue House, Korea's
domestic economy was no longer severely suffering and the Sino-Korean relationship
seemed to be stable. His inauguration speech did not discuss Korea's trade with China,
yet Rho Moo Hyun could have benefited from Kim Dae Jung's achievement of SinoKorean bilateral companionship. On November 16-17, 2005, ROK leader Rho Moo Hyun
invited Hu Jintao to Korea. Hu and Rho held a presidential summit in Seoul, and both
countries proclaimed an 'Entirely Cooperative Companionship'. Rho's presidential
summit with Hu became the third moment in the Sino-Korean historical relationship.
'Entirely Cooperative Companionship' implies that the PRC and the ROK were satisfied
with diplomatic progress, so that they were willing to take the bilateral relationship
further.
The presidents agreed to enhance bilateral negotiation and cooperation. This
opened a hot-line between the Chinese and Korean foreign ministers which allowed them
to share their views freely. Hu Jintao and Rho Moo Hyun celebrated the fact that SinoKorean bilateral trade reached $100 billion in 2000, three years earlier than they
originally expected, and they would make efforts to reach $ 200 billion by 2012.102
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The Cold War created a gap in the Sino-Korean bilateral relationship. However,
since the establishment of the normal diplomatic relationship in 1992, the PRC and the
ROK significantly expanded their economic ties. After Kim Dae Jung's presidency,
Beijing and Seoul have collaborated for mutual economic benefit, and these
achievements were carried over to the Rho Moo Hyun and Hu Jintao administrations. The
bilateral agreements are more inclusive, so that the two countries are willing to cooperate
in many other sectors in order to positively stimulate trade. The following analysis of the
historical disputes and Korea's and China's way of handing the issue further demonstrate
the strong friendship of the two countries.
Sino-Korean Disputes
The historical dispute between the PRC and the ROK is a good example showing
how importantly Beijing and Seoul regarded the bilateral relationship. In 2004, Beijing
10^

and Seoul encountered a dispute over the Goguryeo Kingdom (37 B.C. to 668 A.D.).
The Goguryeo Kingdom was regarded as part of Korean history by Korea, yet the "PRC
claimed that Goguryeo was part of Chinese history."104 The kingdom controlled parts of
the territory which used to belong to Korea, but currently is part of the PRC. The PRC
Foreign Ministry decided to "remove content on Korean history from its website
unilaterally, and this action caused the anti-Chinese sentiment among the general public
in Korea."105 China's claim gave a rise to Korea's angry reaction, thus creating a worry
that may adversely affect the continuous efforts between China and Korea. In fact, there
was a public opinion that claimed that "China's hegemonic ambition has been

Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations: A Turning Point for China-Korea Relations," 109.
Scott Snyder, 109.
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exposed."

The general public's reaction to the Chinese attitude was rapidly spread to

the Korean peninsula. Since public opinion played a significant role in shaping foreign
policy in Korea, it was urgent to calm down public anger.
Korean reaction over the historical dispute put pressure on the MOFAT to resolve
the situation.107 Beijing sent PRC Vice Minister Wu Dawei, who was the former
ambassador to the ROK, to handle the issue. The two countries, after the negotiation,
"announced a five-point verbal agreement designed to manage the Goguryeo issue in a
manner sensitive to Korean concerns and to prevent the issue from affecting other aspects
of the relationship."108 Basically, the PRC and the ROK left the dispute to the public and
decided to regard it as an academic issue, but not a government dispute.109 In other words,
the two governments did not want to get involved in this historical dispute since it would
probably damage their economic relationship. This was a significant turning point in the
Sino-Korean relationship. The announcement by the PRC and the ROK clearly showed
that the two governments were collaborating with one another to preserve the bilateral
relationship. Given the fact that Beijing and Seoul did not have mutual recognition in the
pre-1992 period, the mutual collaboration over the conflict revealed that the bilateral
friendship has deepened significantly over the past 12 years since its establishment.
China's and Korea's approach to the historical disputes demonstrated Kim Dae
Jung's personal efforts to enhance his friendship with Jiang. Koreans were angry over the
dispute after the announcement, claiming that the Korean government's willingness
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would make Korea controlled by the Chinese government as it used to be in the past. Yet,
the president and his cabinet members had no intention to confront the Chinese
authorities. Instead, for the sake of economic cooperation, the two countries were willing
to resolve the situation peacefully. This was a fundamental attitude change for both
countries.
Kim Dae Jung believed that Korea should move on from the perception that
China was a mother controller of Korea. As Kim Dae Jung articulated in his New Year
speech in 2000, Kim believed that the world has just encountered a new millennium
era.110 The new world required Korea to adapt changes such as segyehwa and the
importance of knowledge in the technologically developed world. In order to become a
competitive society, Korea must not see China through the historical eye in which
Koreans regarded their country as China's puppet. This new vision towards the 21 st
century and Kim's personal peaceful way of dealing with transnational conflicts helped
resolve the Sino-Korean historical issues.
Rho Moo Hyun Administration and FTA
Starting in 2004, Beijing and Seoul discussed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
The Korean government regarded FTAs as a type of economic integration, in which
related countries aim to remove trade barriers such as tariffs while trading products and
services.111 The Sino-Korean bilateral talk on the FTA began at the scholarly level, aided
by the government. In September 2004 at the ASEAN +3 economic ministers' conference,
China and Korea agreed on joint research for the FTA program. In 2005, China's
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Development Research Center (DRC) and Korea's Institute for International Economic
Policy (KIEC) completed the first year joint research on the bilateral FTA. During the
presidential summit in February 2005 between Rho Moo Hyun and Hu Jintao, both
presidents expressed their satisfaction on the launch of Sino-Korean FTA research. They
hoped that China and Korea would critically discuss the issues, complete the research
report, and make policy recommendations to the government on time.
Beijing and Seoul held a second round conference in Korea between July 3 and
July 4, 2005 to review the validity of the Sino-Korean FTA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Trade (MOFAT) announced that the Chinese and Korean governments would
predominantly discuss commodities in their joint research. Furthermore, the PRC and the
ROK would set regulations on product origins, customs procedures, trade, and both
i n

countries' economic situations as well as investment relationships.
China and Korea began a third round of the conference, which discussed the SinoKorean FTA industrial-government-educational institution joint research from October
2007 in Weihai (J$c#|). Before the FTA conference, MOFAT announced that Park Hyo
Sung, the executive representative of the MOFAT, as well as approximately 40 affiliates,
would participate, and Zhang Kenning and 40 other affiliates would join the meeting
from China.114 MOFAT added that both parties would continue to research the
effectiveness of the Sino-Korean FTA in products services, and investment sectors more
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comprehensively. It was expected that this would provide a great opportunity for the
governments, education institutes, and companies to participate and discuss.
The fourth round of the talk on FTA was held on February 18 through 20 in 2008
on the island of Cheju. The two parties, this time, negotiated on products (manufactured
products and agricultural-fishery products) as well as other issues, and they arrived in an
agreement on manufacture, origins of products, customs clearance, intellectual property
rights, competition, economic cooperation, and SPS (service propulsion system). The
joint research report consists of 6 sections, divided into 18 sub-categories. The two
countries agreed upon 15 of them at this time.116
The discussion of the Free Trade Agreement between the PRC and the ROK
shows the efforts to create a free trade area in the region. The two governments assigned
research institutes to take responsibility for the FTA talks, thus carefully planning the
FTA establishment. By having research institutes examine the FTA before the
governments made trade policies, the two governments were approaching the negotiation
cautiously. After researchers examined the validity of the FTA between the PRC and the
ROK, government officials began to discuss trade commodities, rules, and regulations.
China and Korea have been discussing trade procedures in order to ensure that importers
and exporters exchange commodities without violating regulations to facilitate trade flow.
The FTA negotiations included a joint cooperation of government officials,
research institutes, and business sectors. The government officials were in charge of
making laws and rules in order to provide foundations for better bilateral trade. The
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research institutes actively examined the validity, effectiveness, and possible advantages
of the FTA for both countries. They also evaluated each country's economic situation
before deciding on which types of commodities and service areas would be negotiated
negotiation. Business sectors invested in and exported commodities to China. These three
levels of collaboration in the FTA have implications for regional integration.
The Sino-Korean FTA could contribute to the further enhancement of bilateral
trade. Beijing's and Seoul's investors do not need to be burdened with as many
regulations. Because the FTA discussion is actively supported by the Korean government,
the government also is cooperating with Korean business sectors as well as research
institutes, which would greatly facilitate foreign direct investment in both countries.
Many business sectors, especially information technology, would find Chinese businesses
that are willing to receive Korean technology. Also, many automobile manufacturers
such as Hyundai are already building their factories in mainland China.
The Sino-Korean FTA negotiations have implications for the northeast Asian
region. Korea seems ambitious to become a regional FTA hub.117 Even though the PRC
and the ROK have sought to build a FTA, immediately after the U.S.-FTA negotiation
completed in 2007, "China sought to expedite a feasibility study on the prospects of an
FTA with Korea."118 The Sino-Korean FTA negotiation would be continued by the Lee
Myong-bak administration in 2008.
China would be the most important trading partner in automobiles and
agricultures products.119 The continuous discussion on the FTA between Beijing and
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Korea might bring the region close, thus making regional trade easy. This regional
integration may expand to other countries such as Japan or ASEAN in the future.
Statistical Analysis: Trade
Figurel: Sino-Korean Trade
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Figure 1 shows the imports and exports of Korea's trade with the PRC between
1992 and 2007. The squared dotted line indicates Korea's imports from mainland China
and the triangular dotted line indicates Korea's exports to China. The figure shows that
Sino-Korean bilateral trade slightly increased until 1997, but the growth rate of each year
was not significant. The growth rate was negative in 1998 and then the trade bounced
back. Korea's trade to China began to rise significantly from 2002 until 2007.
Upon the establishment of the relationship in 1992, Korea's trade to China was
approximately $5 billion, and the ROK had a trade deficit. Korea's exports to China were

63

about $ 2 billion, whereas the imports were about $ 3 billion. Seoul's exports to Beijing
steadily increased from 1992 to 1997, and its imports also increased during the same
period. However, the decrease of the trade in 1998 implies that the Asian economic crisis
adversely affected the trade flow.
From 2001, Korea's imports and exports rapidly rebounded. In fact, from 2001 to
2004, the bilateral trade steadily increased. In 2002, Korea's imports were $17 billion and
exports were $23 billion. The imports reached $21 billion in 2003 and then $29 billion in
2004. The exports reached $35 billion in 2003 and then $49 billion in 2004. The growth
rate of the trade became larger from 2004 to 2007. The imports from China to Korea in
2004 were $29 billion, $38 billion in 2005, $48 billion in 2006, and $63 billion in 2007.
The exports from Korea to China were $49 billion in 2004, $61 billion in 2005, $69
billion in 2006, and $81 billion in 2007. The bilateral trade growth shows that the annual
growth rate became much larger after 2003, implying that Kim Dae Jung's presidential
efforts became effective soon after his term finished.
Korea's trade with China increased by 23.4% per year whereas the trade increase
of the international community was only 9.6%. ROK's exports to mainland China
increased by 27.7% every year, while ROK imports rose from the PRC rose 18.8% each
year.

The increase in trade shows that Korea and China were integrating with each

other. In fact, the PRC was the fifth largest trading partner of Korea in 1992 and became
the top trading partner in December 2004. Korea was the seventh largest trading partner
to China in 1992, but became the fourth in 2004.121
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Kim Dae Jung's presidential attempt to convince business sectors and government
officials to further engage with Korea began to show its effectiveness at the end of his
term. As Korea's domestic economy began to stay stable and trade policies were enacted
by the Korean government, the bilateral trade began to increase rapidly. By 2006, it
reached $100 billion, resulting in a surplus for Korea. By the time Kim Dae Jung was
followed by Rho Moo Hyun, Korea's technology sectors were promoted by the
government greatly, so that small and medium firms were able to develop their IT
technology significantly. Kim Dae Jung's repeated emphasis on technology as a
fundamental trade commodity and a tool in increasing Korea's economic power
contributed to the large annual growth rate in trade.
The major export commodities of Korea to China are portable digital automatic
data processing machines. They were not one of the top 50 commodities until 2000. It
was worth only $6oo million in 2001, and the annual growth from 2000 to 2001 was
232%. They were $ 2 billion in 2002, resulting in a 220 % annual growth rate from the
previous year. The exports of the product increased to $11 billion in 2003 with the
growth rate at 413%. They further increased from 2003 to 2004, reaching $20 billion,
increasing 83% from the previous year. They rose to $29 billion in 2005 with 43% of the
annual growth. The exports of the products were $ 38 billion with the annual growth of
28.8% in 2 0 0 6 . m
The remarkable rate of the annual trade growth of digital automatic data
processing machines provides a good example of the role of the IT sectors in SinoKorean relations. They were able, as Kim Dae Jung envisioned, to build a strong
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relationship with Chinese firms. As China opens its market to foreign investors,
especially in order to receive high technology from other countries, Korean technology
firms were able to invest in China, thus contributing to Korea's trade.
Kim Dae Jung believed that segyehwa would create a world market based on
technology. This trend would increase the competition among super economic powers,
meaning that Korea needed to increase its technology sector in order to survive in the
globalized market. Kim Dae Jung's reform, which emphasized the importance of China
as a rising power and the significance of promoting small and medium sectors, facilitated
Korea's trade with China. Kim eventually succeeded in strengthening the Sino-Korean
relationship.
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CHPATER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study examined Korea's globalization with a case study of Sino-Korean
trade. Korea's growing relationship with China was directly influenced by the Korean
presidents' views on globalization. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung emphasized the
emergence of globalization in the 1990s. The differences in educational and foreign
experiences between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung resulted in the gap of their
approaches to segyehwa. Kim Young Sam perceived segyehwa that began to spread in the
international community at the end of the Cold War. Kim Young Sam's emphasis on
segyehwa helped Koreans learn the concept, yet Kim Young Sam failed to apply his
views in practice. Through the abundance of Kim Dae Jung's education in the United
States as well as in England, Kim Dae Jung was able to build knowledge on international
political economic phenomena and provided ways to achieve his economic goals.
Kim Dae Jung successfully launched his reforms upon his inauguration and
furthered Sino-Korean relationship. He believed that under democratic society, the
government should allow the public to easily participate in the economic activities. In
order to encourage small and medium size sectors to actively invest in the market, Kim
Dae Jung restricted the dominance of chaebols first. During his administration,
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small sectors, especially in the information technology firms, were able to maximize their
business, thus contributing to the remarkable development of science technology. The
advancement resulted in the increase of technology transfer from Korea to China,
contributing to the increase of bilateral trade.
Kim Dae Jung's reforms changed the structure of domestic economy, facilitated
trade regimes by modifying the organization of the foreign ministries of trade, and
eventually provided incentives and subsidies to foreign sectors. These economic
modifications created a better climate for trade and attracted foreign investors to consider
Korea as a promising market. Given this economic market improvement, Kim Dae Jung
actively convinced Jiang Zemin to collaborate with Korea and promoted Chinese
business affiliations to cooperate with Korea. These efforts took the Sino-Korean
relationship further and eventually resulted in a companionship.
As segyehwa was defined as a process in the rise of interactions in all sectors such
as economies, society, culture, environment, politics, and diplomacy, Kim Dae Jung
successfully managed to advance the economic relationship by promoting collaborative
works in many different sectors. The China-Korea alliance in politics, society, and
culture collectively helped the bilateral trade further rise, even after Kim Dae Jung left
his office.
Kim Dae Jung's attempt to improve Korean economy until his resignation was
carried over by the Rho Moo Hyun administration. President Hu Jintao and Rho Moo
Hyun negotiated a FTA deal by providing assistance to research institutes and the
governments. The FTA talks are still in process, thus making China a more promising
business land. The two countries have encountered disputes over their historical
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relationships, yet these disputes were wisely handled in order to prevent the issues from
adversely impacting the bilateral companionship.
As both qualitative and statistical analysis results indicated, Beijing and Korea
have built a strong companionship over time. Even though there are disputes between the
two nations, the governments are peacefully negotiating with one another. The discussion
on the establishment of the FTA implies there could be a further promotion of the
bilateral relationship in the near further. The PRC-ROK economic alliance is no longer a
new concept for a majority of Koreans. Investors are actively building bridges with one
another and they are also cooperation in many different fields such as environments.
This study explained the course of the evolution of Sino-Korean trade, yet there
are several places that can be improved in the future. Kim Dae Jung discussed only
briefly about the background of his arrival at Harvard, but did not address how he
acquired his current knowledge of economy. Thus, it would have made this study more
thorough if it was possible to interview any faculty members who remembered Kim Dae
Jung's experiences at Harvard University. Another part is that due to the lack of
publications on this topic, it was difficult to comprehensively analyze the outcomes of
Sino-Korean presidential summits. There have been more than five presidential summits
since 1992, but the summit results between Hu Jintao and Rho Moo Hyun were the only
document released to the public. Even though Kim Dae Jung's meeting with Jiang Zemin
had significant consequences, the primary document was not accessible.
China and Korea have developed the friendship over the past fifteen years. Even
though there was a gap of communication during the Cold War, the two countries are
satisfied with the results and are promoting a further enhancement by 2012, which is the
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twentieth anniversary of the establishment. Economic friendship helped Korean culture
influence mainland China, so that the Chinese and Koreans are sharing cultural common
ground. As China becomes a stronger economic power, there would be more competition
among countries that are interested in trading with China. The rise of competition would
make Korea prepare better ways to continuously enhance the bilateral companionship. It
is worthwhile looking whether China and Korea eventually make a final decision on the
FTA in the near future.
In conclusion, the findings of this thesis imply that individual leaders' view on
globalization played a significant role in the rise of Sino-Korean bilateral trade between
1992 and 2007. Korean presidents have much power over economic policies, so that their
individual views on international political economy directly influences Korea's trade
policies with other states. The findings can be generalized, so that they can be applied to
other case studies in the future. Besides the PRC, ROK has already established an FTA
with Chile, the United States, and Singapore. There are also several other FTA treaties
that are pending to be approved. In those cases, it is possible to apply the findings of this
thesis to find whether Korean presidential views on globalization also impacted the
bilateral treaties.
Furthermore, this analysis could be applied to other bilateral trade cases such as
Singapore-U.S. FTA, China-Venezuela bilateral trade, intra-regional economic
relationships of ASEAN, EU, and MERCOSUR to test out whether individual leaders'
view on the world shaped the trade policies. Globalization has made the world become
closer, but increased the international market competition. As discussed in the
introductory chapter, many regions in the world have linked their economic ties and the
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number of bilateral trade has increased between states. South Korea, in which exports
make up a large portion of domestic economy, was ruled by authoritarian regimes for
more than three decades. The results of this study provide a tool to example countries that
pursue outwardly oriented economic markets and have experienced similar political
history.
The study of Sino-Korean economic relationship provides several suggestions for
future study. The bilateral economic cooperation has also resulted in the transfer of
Korean culture to China. The Chinese observe Korean political culture and apply these
ideas in their politics. Korea has enormously influenced Chinese pop culture, so there is a
cultural community between the two countries. Moreover, China has also been
cooperating with North Korea. China and North Korea are trading in Sinuiju, which is
located in northwestern North Korea near the border between North Korea and China.
Since South Korea is conducting industrial projects in North Korea, Sinuiju can be an
important trading destination for the triangular trade in the future. In the future, it will be
worth examining individual leaders' role in the triangular trade in northeast Asia
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